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IN .THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

------------------------J, SEAL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

(
)

LESLIE LeFEVRE, et al,

Case No. 11307

(

Defendants and Respondents. )

----------------------------------BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE
The Appellant, J. SEAL, having brought suit for
breach of an express or implied contract for services rendered
lby its Assignor, an attorney, appeals from an Order granting
I

Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial Court granted Defendants 1 Motion for

i

lummary Judgment based on supporting Affidavits, following
lppellant's filing of opposing Affidavits thereto and on the
~sis of briefs submitted by both parties on the ground and

uthe reason that "the proof . . . negatives any" express
rimplied promise for a contract of employment and there
was

therefore no material issue of fact.
REUEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits the Summary Judgment of the trial

:Curt should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial
~

the merits •
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Attorney Harold A. Ranquist, Appellant's Assignor,

las retained in 19 64 by the holder of a permit on the Federal

ange in Kanab Grazing District No. 11, managed by the

ureau of Land Management, pursuant to the Taylor Grazing
ct, to prosecute an appeal under the administrative protdure of the Federal Range Code. From an Order of the
•nab District Manager of the Bureau of Land Management
quiring, among' other things, that all cattle be removed

ii

from the Federal Range and placed on base property for two
11)

months.

This issue was common to all of the livestock

men in the district, including the Respondents (R. 27).
The officer of the Kane County Cattlemen's Assoc.,
The Escalante Cattlemen's Assoc., and the Tropic Permittees

met and agreed to retain the services of Appellant's Assignor
and to bring the necessary action to resolve all of the disputes between their members and the Kanab District Office
of the B. L. M. (R. 28).

These associations agreed to pay Appellant's Assign-

or for his services and to collect the same by sending to each
llf their members a letter, asking them to participate in meetings designed to discover the nature of their complaints.

:(R. 53, 55 and 58).
In addition, the members were to be contacted in
!person and asked to pay an assessment of ten cents (10¢) per

A, U. M., as their pro-rata share of the attorney's fees.
(R, 28).

Each of the Respondents were advised in several

ii

~r[tten

communications of the existence of the problems and

~they affected each permittee in the entire District.
liter being invited to the meetings they were all advised that
lliey would be assessed if they participated in the attempt to
the problems facing the livestock men of the District.

~solve

~. 25) •

Each of the Respondents then participated in the
neetings in an attempt to communicate all of the facts inrolved in the dispute to the head of the U. S. Bureau of

~nd Management. (R. 29).
On December 16, 1964, Appellant's Assignor reached
In agreement with the B. L. M., a copy of which was sent to
~e

Respondents (R. 66) that provided, among other things,

~e

important provision that

10

11

(t) he B. L. M. will not attempt

enforce a program of making each permittee remove his

ltvestock completely from the Federal Range for a two
nonth, or one month period.

11

(R. 62 and 63).

On December 21, 1964, all the Respondents were in!ormed that the major problem involving the use of the Range
iii

In the Kanab District had been solved and that they must

each sign a Range Management Agreement to protect their

A. U. M., at meetings to be held on December 29, 1964,
and that if their assessment had not been paid they should
come prepared to make arrangements for payments. (R. 58).

In accordance with the understanding previously
agreed to, one hundred sixty (160) livestock men in the

district paid their pro-rata share to the respective cattle-

men's associations who remitted the sum to Plaintiff's

lssignor, but the sixty (60)Res pondents herein refused to

nake payment.

(R. 29).

Res pendent' s made a Motion for Summary Judgment

witb supporting Affidavits from four (4) of the sixty (60)

\espondents in which those four (4) stated that each knew"of

lis own personal knowledge that none of the Defendant's

!Ver

had any contractual relationship, either verbal or

vritten", with Plaintiff's Assignor "for the performance of

1ny legal services."

(R. 18, 22, 20 and 24). The Motion

vas granted by the trial Court dismissing out of hand

lppellant' s First Claim for breach of an express contract
1v

with nothing more than the comment that, "Plaintiff relies

principally on the doctrine of Quantum Meruit" and dismissed his Second Cause of Action, pleaded in the alternative on
the theory of implied contract, on the basis of Defendants'

Affidavits for the reason that there was no proof of any contract of employment either express or implied. (R. 96).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

i
AN IMPLIED PROMISE ON THE PART OF THE
hsPONDENT TO PAY THE SERVICES OF AN ATTORNEY ARISES
~HERE HE KNOWINGLY ACCEPTS THE BENEFITS OF THE SER'1!CES, OR A SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST IS PRESERVED, OR THE
~ESPONDENT FAILS TO OBJECT OR PROTEST AND WHERE ALL
THREE CON DITIONS EXIST IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE
TRIAL COURT TO GRANT RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT.
1

Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of an
~ttorney's

services rendered on his behalf, an implied prom-

lse to pay the value of his services arises.

Bogorad v.

~hwartz, C.A. 4 Md., 208 F.2d 704 (1953); and the cases

Cited in 7 8 ALR 2d 318.
-1-

While there is some conflict in the cases on this

,point, they were reconciled in 78 ALR 2d. 322:

"It should be pointed out that the knowledge
mentioned is not merely knowledge that the services
are being rendered, but know ledge that they are
being rendered by the attorney on behalf of one who
knows, or has reason to know, that the attorne 1 , ~
looking to him for payment. If this is kept in rninu
in reading the cases, seemingly conflicts case will
be harmonized to request intent."
The Respondents in this case received a copy of an
agreement setting forth the benefits they were to receive
~R. 66) as a result of a successfully prosecuted appeal

following their attendance at meetings designed to ascertain
!their complaints against the B. L. M. Range policies (R. 29).
Along with the copy of the agreement they received a request
to pay for the legal services. (R. 67).

Therefore, since the

Respondents knowingly received the benefits following their
active role in the prosecution of a successful appeal an imPlied contract arose for the payment of those legal services.
In Burnett v. Graves, C. A. 5 Texas, 230 P. 2d 49
(1956); 56 ALR 2d. 1, the Court held that when an implied

Promise to pay the reasonable value of the services of an

-2-

attorney arises, one factor of significance is the preserva-

•ion of a substantial interest.

In the instant case, all of the Respondents were
faced with the prospect of having to remove their cattle from

the Federal Ranges for as much as two (2) months.

Upon the

successful resolution of the issues by Appellant's Assignor,
they each received, among other benefits, an agreement
,that "(t)he B. L. M., will not attempt to enforce a program
!of
making each permittee remove
his livestock completely
I
.

I

!from the Federal Range for a two month, or one month period. "
(R. 62 and 63).

The benefits were substantial and according-

lyan implied promise to pay arose with respect to the pay-

ment of the attorney's fees.
In Brown v. Friesleben Estate 184 Cal. App. 2 720,
l07 P. 2d 388 (1957), the Court observed that when the

Defendant h'as knowledge that an attorney is performing
valuable services for him and fails to object, or dissent
from such performance, an implied promise to pay the
reasonable value of the services arises.
-3-

Respondents were contacted by letter and in person
and asked to pay a pro-rata share of the attorney's fees
R,

28).

Each of the Respondents was advised in several

written communications of the existence of the problem and
that if they participated in the attempt to resolve the probJem facing the livestock men of the District, they would be
I

assessed for the attorney's fees.

(R. 29).

After being informed of the proposed assessment they
all attended meetings in an attempt to resolve the dispute
I ,

'with the B. L. M. (R. 29).

Further, after the successful

settlement of the issue, they were again informed by mail
of the then obligation to pay for the services and while
one hundred sixty (160) of the cattlemen paid their assess-

ments, the Respondents refused to pay (R. 20).
At no time did the Respondents object or dissent

from the performance of the services which gave rise to the
dispute herein and therefore an implied promise to pay for
the reasonable value of the services arose.
Since an implied promise to pay arises when only

-4-

one

of the three factors above mentioned are present, to-wit:
1.
2.
3.

knowing acceptance of the benefits of
the services
the preservation of a substantial interest
the failure to object or protest

,when all three factors are present, as here, a fortiori, an
implied promise to pay the reasonable value of the services
arises.
POINT II.
RULE 5 6 (e} OF THE U. R. C. P. REQUIRES AN
FIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
0 BE BASED ON SUCH FACTS AS WOULD BE ADMISSIBLE IN
MDENCE AND RECEPTION OF FOUR OF RESPONDENTS'
AFFIDAVITS CLAIMING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT NONE OF
!HE OTHER FIFTY-SIX RESPONDENTS ENTERED INTO AN EX'PRESS OR IMPLIED AGREEMENT WITH APPELLANT'S ASSIGNOR
IS HEARSAY AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED THEREON IS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.

~
·.

In McCormick on Evidence, Chap. 25 (1954), it is
observed:
"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or
written evidence of a statement made out of court,
such statement being offered as an assertion to
show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out
of court assertor."
The four (4) Affidavits in support of Respondents'

-5-

-I Motion for Summary Judgment set forth the following:

"The Affiant states that he knows of his own
knowledge that~ of the defendants above named
ever had any contractual relationship; either verbal
or written . • . . for the performance of any legal
services. • • " (R. 18, 20, 22 and 24) (Emphasis
added.).
If the four (4) Respondents' personal knowledge is
i

based on what the other fifty-six Respondents told them it
would be founded on the out of court assertions of each of
them and as such, hearsay, and would not be in compliance
with the requirements of Rule 56 (e), U. R. C. P., and the
Affidavits were erroneously received.
Further, since there were several meetings, all

i Respondents
I

being in attendance of at least one of them

(R. 29}, it stretches credibility to think that the four (4)
Respondents were present at all meetings knowing positively
. that during the same, none of the other fifty-six (5 6) Respendents ever made an express or implied agreement.
POINT III.
A UNILATERAL CONTRACT IS ONE IN WHICH NO

-o-

pROMISOR RECEIVES A PROMISE OR CONSIDERATION FOR HIS
PROMISE AND WHEN FACTS ALLEGE ACCEPTANCE BY A
SPECIFIC ACT APPELLANT HAS PLACED A MATERIAL FACT IN
ISSUE AND IT IS ERROR FOR TRIAL COURT TO GRANT MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In Port Huron Machinery Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa
826, 221 N. W. 843 (1928), the Court observed with respect
'to

acceptance of a unilateral offer:
"An offer may invite an acceptance to be
made by merely an affirmative answer or by performing a specific act."

The Restatement of Contracts, A. L.

I.S

12, P. 10, sets

forth the following:

"A unilateral contract is one in which no
promiser receives a promise or consideration for his
promise . • • comment a. In a unilateral contract
the exchange for the promise is something other
than a promise. "
In the instant case each of the Respondents were
advised that if they attended and participated in meetings
designed to resolve the problem facing the livestock men
that they would be assessed a pro-rata share of the attorney's
fee.

Subsequently, each of the Respondents attended and

participated in these meetings.

-7-

(R. 29).

The offer of the Appellant's Assignor was clearly
communicated to the Respondents and the method of acceptance set forth in the form of an act: to-wit, the attendance
and participation in meetings designed to resolve the probterns of all the live stock men.

The Respondents then

,accepted by attendance and participation.

Despite the

trial Court's only comment as to Appellant's First Claim for

relief that

11

(p)laintiff relies principally on the doctrine of

Quantum Meruit,

11

(R. 9 6) the foregoing facts demonstrate

that a unilateral contract was entered into by the parties

herein and the Order granting Respondents' Motion for
:Summary Judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

David A. Goodwill
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
330 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah

-8-

